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Settlement of the Macao Issue: Distinctive Features 
of Beijing's Negotiating Behavior 
Jaw-ling Joanne Chang* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost a quarter of a century ago, in a March 8, 1963 People's Daily 
(Renmin Ribao) editorial the People's Republic of China ("PRC") an-
nounced its policy to settle "peacefully through negotiations" the ques-
tions of Hong Kong and Macao "when conditions are ripe."' 
On September 26, 1984, the PRC and the United Kingdom initialed 
. in Beijing the so-called Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong 
Kong. 2 This agreement was reached after two years of negotiations. It 
was signed by Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Premier 
Zhao Ziyang on December 19, 1984 and ratifications were exchanged on 
May 27, 1985. According to the Joint Declaration, the United King-
dom's sovereignty and jurisdiction over Hong Kong will cease in 1997.3 
Hong Kong will thereupon become a Special Administrative Region of 
the PRC under article 31 of the PRC Constitution on July 1, 1997.4 It 
will enjoy a "high degree of autonomy," except in defense and foreign 
affairs. The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will re-
main unchanged for fifty years after 1997.5 
On March 26, 1987, the PRC reached a similar agreement with Por-
tugal on the question of Macao.6 The so-called Joint Declaration on the 
• Associate Professor of Political Science, National Taiwan University; Research Associate, 
Institute of American Culture, Academia Sinica. Presently Visiting Scholar, East Asian Legal Stud-
ies Program, University of Maryland School of Law. Ph.D., University of Maryland; M.A., Univer-
sity of Delaware. 
I J. COHEN & H. CHIU, I PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 380 (1974). 
2 Joint Declaration on Hong Kong Initialed, BEIJING REV., Oct. I, 1984, at 6. 
3 Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland On the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 
19, 1984, United Kingdom-People's Republic of China 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmd. 9352) para. 
I [hereinafter Hong Kong Joint Declaration], reprinted in 23 l.L.M. 1371 (1984) (within the British 
White Paper referred to as the Draft Agreement). 
4 /d. 
s /d. para. 3(12). 
6 China to Resume Sovereignty Over Macao, BEIJING REv., Apr. 6, 1987, at 7. For an analysis 
of the negotiation of the Joint Declaration, see Deng, Comments and Analysis on the Sino-Portuguese 
'Macao Question' Agreement, IssuES AND STUD., June 10, 1987, at 31-40; Kuo, Comments on the 
Sino-Portuguese Negotiations on the Macao Question, STUD. IN COMMUNISM, July 15, 1987, at 49-55; 
(2) 
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Question of Macao was signed by Portugal's Prime Minister Anibal 
Cavaco Silva and Zhao Ziyang in Beijing on April 13, 1987. Ratifica-
tions of this Joint Declaration were exchanged on January 15, 1988 in 
Beijing. 7 The PRC will resume its sovereignty over Macao on December 
20, 1999.8 Macao will also become a Special Administrative Region of 
the PRC, similar to Hong Kong, with a high degree of autonomy, except 
in defense and foreign affairs. The current social and economic systems 
in Macao will remain unchanged, as will the freedoms associated with its 
life style, for fifty years after 1999.9 
The similarities of the Hong Kong and Macao settlements are ap-
parent, and, accordingly one is strongly tempted to couple them together 
as woven from the same cloth. While the Hong Kong negotiations and 
settlement have been accorded substantial scholarly attention, 10 this has 
not been the case with Macao. 
This article closely analyzes the Macao settlement from the perspec-
tive of Beijing's negotiating tactics, with peripheral glances at the Hong 
Kong settlement for comparative purposes. The article discerns, there-
fore, the distinctive features of the Macao settlement. 
Because of the complexity and secrecy involved with the Macao and 
Hong Kong negotiations, this article emphasizes only the most signifi-
cant and controversial issues bargained by the PRC with the United 
Kingdom and Portugal, respectively. 
On the Hong Kong question, the most difficult issue between the 
PRC and United Kingdom was whether Britain could continue her sov-
ereignty and administration of Hong Kong after 1997. In contrast, Lis-
bon agreed in 1974 that the PRC had sovereignty over Macao. 11 The 
major disputes, however, were: when should Portugal return Macao to 
the PRC, and how to resolve the problems associated with the question 
of nationality. 
The United Kingdom in 1984 made concessions on both sovereignty 
and administration issues. 12 In 1987, Portugal gained more concessions 
Yu, An Analysis on the Chicom-Portuguese 'Agreement' on Macao, STUD. ON CHINESE COMMUNISM 
MONTHLY, Apr. 15, 1987, at 71-78. 
7 People's Daily, Jan. 16, 1988, at I. 
s Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government 
of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macao [hereinafter Macao Joint Declaration], Annex 
I, §I, reprinted in BEIJING REv., Apr. 6, 1987 (special insert). 
9 /d. paras. 2-3, Annex I. 
10 For a selected bibliography, see THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG 243-54 (H. Chiu, Y.C. Jao & 
Y.L. Wu eds. 1987). 
ll Macau, ASIA 1987 YEARBOOK 181 (1987) [hereinafter Macau '87]. 
12 Background to the Negotiations Preceding the Sino-British Joint Declaration, in THE FUTURE 
OF HONG KoNG, supra note 10, at 197-222 (detailing the Sino-British Negotiations on Hong Kong). 
See generally F. CHING, HONG KONG AND CHINA FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE (1985) (discussing 
the Sino-British negotiations on the sovereignty and administration issues). 
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from the PRC, however, than the United Kingdom had negotiated. 13 
The PRC originally wanted to take over Macao and Hong Kong at the 
same time in 1997. 14 Portugal, on the other hand, did not want to return 
Macao in 1997. 15 A compromise was reached between Beijing and Lis-
bon. Macao will be returned to the PRC in 1999. 16 On the question of 
nationality, the PRC apparently acquiesced to the Portuguese demand of 
dual nationality. 
What are the distinctive features of the Macao settlement? Why did 
the PRC make more concessions to the Portuguese than to the British? 
These questions, together with Beijing's negotiating tactics, are the main 
focus of this study. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
As early as 1516, Portuguese traders were using Macao as a stop-
over on the voyage to JapanY The right to anchor and trade in the 
oldest European settlement in East Asia was gained through bribery of 
local officials by the Portuguese in 1535. 18 Portuguese settlement of Ma-
cao was agreed to by the Chinese in 1557,19 but actual Portuguese Ad-
13 Portugal also gained more protection for the Portuguese descendants in the Sino-Portuguese 
agreement: "The Macao Special Administrative Region shall protect, according to law, the interests 
of residents of Portuguese descent in Macao and shall respect their customs and cultural traditions." 
Macao Joint Declaration, supra note 8, Annex I, § V. There is an absence of such a provision in the 
Sino-British Agreement on the Hong Kong question. In addition, the Sino-Portuguese agreement 
does not mention the stationing of Chinese military forces. The Sino-British agreement, on the 
hand, states "Military forces sent by the Central People's Government to be stationed in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region for the purpose of defence shall not interfere in the internal 
affairs of the ... Region." Hong Kong Joint Declaration, supra note 3, Annex I, § XIII. For 
further comparisons, see Leung & Yeung, How Macau's Pact Differs from Ours, S. China Morning 
Post, Mar. 27, 1987, at 7; Macao Agreement to be Commended, S. China Morning Post, Mar. 24, 
1987, at 14, reprinted in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, Mar. 24, 1987, at W3 (here-
inafter F.B.I.S.); Lin, There are Gains and Losses in Sino-Portuguese and Sino-British Agreements, 
PAl SHING, Apr. 16, 1987, at 47-48. 
14 Yu, Macao's Past, Present, and Future, in SELECTED INFORMATION ON MACAO 1535-1985 
12 (1985) (On October 3, 1984, Deng Xiaoping told a delegation from Hong Kong and Macao that 
"the Macao question, like Hong Kong, will be settled at the same time and with the same formula." 
Deng's remark drew strong reactions from Macao. Three days later, Deng told Ma Man Kee, chair-
man of Macao's General Chamber of Commerce and a local deputy of the National People's Con-
gress of the PRC, that "there is no rush for the Macao issue. It may be seven or eight years or even 
longer before we talk about it. Please have confidence, continue working." On March 30, 1985, 
Peng Zhen said: "The Macao question [is] like Hong Kong ... people in Hong Kong and Macao 
should both be prepared to return to the motherland on July I, .1997."). 
IS For a further discussion, see infra part III. 
16 Macao Joint Declaration, supra note 8, para. 3. 
17 BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES, MACAU 3 (Oct. 
1982). 
18 Huan, Macao Faces Historical Change, BEIJING REV., May 26, 1986, at 21. 
19 BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., supra note 17, at 3. 
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ministration over Macao was not recognized until 1849.2° China refused 
until 1887 to recognize Portugal's right of "perpetual occupation."21 
This occurred only when Portugal agreed "never to alienate Macao and 
its dependencies without agreement with China.'m This Manchu-Portu-
guese agreement was known as the Protocol of Lisbon. 23 
With the rise in power of the Chinese Communists in 1949, came 
the retraction of the Protocol of Lisbon. The Chinese stated that the 
agreement was an "unequal treaty" imposed by foreigners on China and 
was, therefore, invalid.24 In 1951, Macao was termed by the Portuguese 
to be an Overseas Province.25 Meanwhile, however, the PRC made no 
attempt to regain Macao. Beijing's position was that "when conditions 
are ripe," the Macao issue "should be settled peacefully through negotia-
tions and that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be 
maintained. "26 
Portugal, on the other hand, made two unsuccessful attempts to re-
turn Macao to China in 1967 and 1974. In November and December 
1966 during the Cultural Revolution, a confrontation between local, mili-
tant leftist Chinese elements and the Macao police provoked civil distur-
bances. From December 1-4, massive demonstrations launched by 
militant leftists against the Macao government turned into riots. At least 
eight people were killed, 212 injured, and 61 arrested.27 Macao's Portu-
guese Governor, Brigadier Nobre de Carvalho, was reported to have of-
fered to abandon Macao within one month. 28 The PRC was not ready to 
accept this offer, apparently because it feared acceptance would adversely 
affect the prosperity of Hong Kong. Moreover, the PRC generated about 
half of its foreign exchange earnings through its annual trade with Hong 
Kong and Macao.29 Any sign of instability, such as a change in sover-
20 /d. See a/so ALMANAC OF MACAU'S EcONOMY 4 (H. Wong eel. 1986). 
21 Macao was ceded in perpetuity to Portugal under art. 2 of the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of 
Dec. I, 1887. For the text of the treaty, see 2 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, ETC., BETWEEN CHINA 
AND FOREIGN STATES 274-75 (2d eel. 1973). 
22 Macau, ASIA 1982 YEARBOOK 191 (1982) [hereinafter Macau '82]. 
23 BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., supra note 17, at 3. 
24 ld. 
25 Macau '82, supra note 22, at 191. 
26 I PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY, supra note I, 
at 380. 
27 Macao, ASIA 1968 YEARBOOK 230 (1968) [hereinafter Macao '68]. 
28 /d. 
29 Macao, ASIA 1975 YEARBOOK 211 (1975) (hereinafter Macao '75]. See also China, ASIA 
1968 YEARBOOK 156 (1968); China, ASIA 1969 YEARBOOK 148-49 (1969) (In 1966, China had a 
favorable trade balance of $472.04 million. In 1967, because of local riots, Hong Kong's imports 
from China were substantially down. China's favorable trade balance dropped to $388.88 million in 
1967.). For details of the riots that exploded in Hong Kong in 1967, see Hong Kong, ASIA 1968 
YEARBOOK 165-66 (1968). For trade figures between Hong Kong and the PRC 1950-1985, see 
YEARBOOK ON CHINESE COMMUNISM 11-45 (1987). 
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eigns, would have been immediately felt in Hong Kong. The Chinese 
feared a flight of capital from the British colony, as later happened dur-
ing 1967 riots, so the PRC wished to maintain the status quo. 30 
The confrontation was resolved in January 1967. A protocol was 
signed between the Portuguese officials in Macao and leftist organiza-
tions. 31 Indeed, the Portuguese accepted responsibility for the riots, and 
agreed to pay about H.K.$2.5 million "compensation.'m In addition, 
the Portuguese agreed to eliminate the Kuomintang influence, and to 
close its border to refugees from the adjacent mainland. 33 As a result of 
the riots, therefore, Beijing gained a real ability to influence Macao's 
affairs. 34 
After Portugal's April 25, 1974 revolution, its new socialist govern-
ment quickly introduced a new constitution which, among other things, 
abolished Portugal's long-time colonial policy. 35 The new government 
tried, unsuccessfully, to negotiate returning Macao to China. The 1976 
Portuguese constitution states that Macao is not Portuguese territory but 
is under Portuguese administration. 36 The departure on December 31, 
1975 of the 400 year-old symbol of Portuguese military presence, the lo-
cal garrison, reflected the change in the attitude of the government. 37 
Lisbon unilaterally recognized the PRC on January 6, 1975.38 The 
Lisbon government, on February 1, 1979, acknowledged that the Macao 
issue was interfering with establishment of diplomatic relations. 39 How-
ever, Lisbon and Beijing finally normalized relations on February 8, 
1979.40 It was revealed in 1985 that an understanding between Lisbon 
and Beijing had been reached: Beijing considered Macao's status as an 
issue to be settled when conditions are ripe, while Portugal considered 
Macao to be a Chinese territory under Portuguese administration.41 
During the 1982-84 Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong 
30 Macau '75, supra note 29, at 211. 
31 BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., supra note 17, at 3. 
32 Macao '68, supra note 27, at 230. 
33 /d. 
34 Macao '75, supra note 29, at 211. See also R. ROBINSON, CONTEMPORARY PORTUGAL 105-
06 (1979); Cremer, A Model for Macau?, ASIAN AFF., Winter 1986-87, at 54. 
3S R. ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 224, 257 (stating "[t]he new constitution of the Portuguese 
Republic was approved by the Constituent Assembly on April 2, 1976."). 
36 Cremer, supra note 34, at 45. 
37 Macau, ASIA 1977 YEARBOOK 219 (1977). 
38 Macau, ASIA 1978 YEARBOOK 236 (1978). 
39 Macau, ASIA 1980 YEARBOOK 225 (1980). 
40 /d. at 224. See Sino-Portuguese Positions on the Macao Question, in SELECTED INFORMA-
TION ON MACAO 1535-1985, supra note 14, at 28. 
41 BuREAU OF PuB. AFF., supra note 17, at 3. See also Portuguese President's Press lnteniew in 
Macau, May 17. 1985, [hereinafter Portuguese President's Press lnteniew] in PROBLEMS OF MACAU: 
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON MACAU (2) at 8 (1986). 
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question, Macao's future also became a subject of speculation. Liao 
Chengzhi, then Director of the Hong Kong!Macao Office in Beijing, an-
nounced in January 1983 that the Macao issue would be dealt with after 
an agreement with the British was reached over Hong Kong.42 On June 
16, 1981, however, Macao's Governor, Vasco de Almeida e Costa,43 had 
insisted that there was a major difference between the Hong Kong and 
Macao issues. Costa stated that Macao is not a colony, and there is no 
deadline which would mark the end of Portuguese administration.44 
After the settlement of the Hong Kong issue in 1984, the PRC 
showed renewed interest in repossessing Macao. During the first visit by 
Portuguese President Ramalho Eanes in May 1985, 'the PRC raised the 
Macao issue. 45 The significance of the visit was heightened by the release 
of a joint communique stating that the Macao issue would be negotiated 
in !he near future through diplomatic channels. 46 This announcement 
put an end to any lingering hopes that the people of Macao might be 
ignored by the Chinese while Hong Kong prepared to return to the 
PRC's sovereignty. 
In March 1986, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhou Nan, the head of 
the Chinese delegation which negotiated the Hong Kong issue, visited 
Portugal to attend the inauguration of the newly elected Portuguese 
President, Mario Soares. Zhou Nan brought up the Macao issue during 
his Lisbon trip, and both sides agreed to start negotiations in May 
1986.47 
III. THE MACAO NEGOTIATIONS 
A. Summary of the Macao Negotiations 
The first round of talks was held in Beijing on June 30 and July 1, 
1986, and the PRC and Portugal reached an agreement on the general 
agenda for future talks.48 They also exchanged views on some substan-
tive matters, but informed sources believe the most important exchange 
resulted in an agreement that the transfer date for Macao would com-
prise a major issue.49 
42 Macau, ASIA 1984 YEARBOOK 207 (1984) [hereinafter Macau '84). 
43 Vasco de Almeida e Costa served as Governor of Macao from 1981-86. 
44 Macau '84, supra note 42, at 207. 
45 Portuguese President's Press Interview, supra note 41, at 7. 
46 Huan, supra note 18, at 21. 
47 Ho, What about Macau?, THE NINETIES, Apr. 1986, at 63. 
48 See PRC-Portugal to Hold Macao Talks 9-10 September, Hong Kong Standard, Aug. 21, 
1986, at 3, reprinted in F.B.I.S., Aug. 21, 1986, at WI. Zhou Nan was the head of the PRC delega-
tion, while Rui Barbosa Medina, Ambassador to the United Nations, headed the Portuguese delega-
tion. For a complete list of Chinese and Portuguese negotiation delegations, see Portuguese 
President's Press Interview, supra note 40, at 4. 
49 Delfs & Lau, New Talks, Old Talks, FAR E. EcoN. REV., July 10, 1986, at 13. 
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Both the second round (September 9-10, 1986) and third round (Oc-
tober 21-22, 1986) were also held in Beijing. After the third round, the 
two sides announced in a joint press communique released on October 
22, 1986 an intent to establish a working group for the settlement of the 
Macao issue. 50 
A working group was formed in Beijing by the delegations of the 
PRC and Portugal governments on December 8, 1986 to discuss and re-
vise in detail all the proposed draft agreements. 51 Zhao Jihua, a member 
of the Chinese negotiation team, was the leader of the PRC working 
group, while the Portuguese group leader was Joao de Deus Ramos, 
member of the Portuguese negotiation team. 
Zhou Nan visited Lisbon on November 17-22, 1986 but no agree-
ment had been reached on the issue of the transfer date. 52 It was not 
until January 1987 that Portugal finally agreed to return Macao to the 
PRC prior to the year 2000.53 The last round of talks was held in Beijing 
March 18-23, 1987 and agreement on the Macao issue was finally 
reached. 54 
B. Negotiation on the Transfer Date 
The PRC originally wanted to take over both Macao and Hong 
Kong at the same time in 1997. ss Portugal, on the other hand, did not 
want to return Macao in 1997. Inasmuch as Portugal had previously 
tried twice, without success, to return Macao to the PRC, one may won-
der why Portugal now preferred to keep Macao beyond 2000. There 
were several reasons. First, Portugal believed that, unlike the return of 
Hong Kong, there was no deadline for the Portuguese government to 
turn over Macao. Portugal maintained that Macao was not a colony, 
rather it was a territory under Portuguese administration. 56 This consti-
tuted a great difference between the Hong Kong and Macao issues. 
Second, Portugal did not want to return Macao to the PRC without 
careful planning. In the mid-1970s, Portugal's decolonization efforts 
were marked by bloodshed and humiliation, leaving behind over a half 
50 PRC-Portugal Group Discusses Macao Issue, reprinted in F.B.I.S., Dec. 9, 1986, at W2. 
51 /d. 
52 PRC, Portugal Disagree on Date For Macao's Return (Hong Kong AFP, Dec. 30, 1986), 
reprinted in F.B.I.S. Dec. 30, 1986, at WI. 
53 Administration to Revert to PRC Before 2000 (Hong Kong AFP, Jan. 7, 1987), reprinted in 
F.B.I.S., Jan. 7, 1987, at WI. 
54 Press Communique (Xinhua News Agency, Mar. 23, 1987), reprinted in F.B.I.S., Mar. 23, 
1987, at W2. 
55 Yu, supra note 14, at 12. 
56 Macao Governor Cited on Relationship with China, Hong Kong Standard, Dec. 29, 1982, at 
16, reprinted in F.B.I.S., Dec. 29, 1982, at W2; Beasant, Beijing Meeting Held To Discuss Macao 
Turnover, S. China Morning Post, Jan. 19, 1987, at 3, reprinted in F.B.I.S., Jan. 23, 1987, at WI. 
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million embittered and destitute colonial refugees.s7 (Table 1) Portugal 
did not want to see a repeat of history in the case of Macao. In Septem-
ber 1986, Macao's Secretary for Economics, Finance and Tourism, Car-
los Monjardino, publicly acknowledged that Portugal had not done 
much in the past 400-odd years in Macao. ss But now, he said, Portugal 
had plans for several development projects such as construction of an 
airport, a deep-sea port and a second bridge linking the Macao mainland 
with Taipa Island. s9 
Table 1 - Portuguese Overseas Territories and Date of Loss 
Area Date Lost 
Territory {in square miles} to Portugal 
Asia 
State of India 1,537 December 1961 
Macao 6 December 1999 
Timor 5,736 December 1975 
Africa 
Guine 13,948 September 1974 
Cape Verde Islands 1,557 July 1975 
Sao Tome e Principe 372 July 1975 
Angola 481,351 November 1975 
Mozambique 303,070 July 1975 
Source: R. ROBINSON, CONTEMPORARY PORTUGAL 95 (1979). 
Third, Portugal thought it would take a long time to localize the 
civil service in Macao. Portuguese is Macao's official language, and all 
its laws, decrees and documents are written in Portuguese. Very few Ma-
canese Chinese speak Portuguese. According to one report, there are 
only seventy-six government employees who know both Portuguese and 
Chinese-less than one percent of the total government employees. 60 
While the Macanese-those of mixed Portuguese and Chinese blood 
(about 5-10,000)-are in a minority, they hold 90% of the local govern-
ment jobs.61 The Macanese have traditionally acted as middlemen be-
tween the majority Cantonese-speaking Chinese population and the 
minority Portuguese rulers. Senior posts in the government, including 
the judiciary and the police, are also held by non-Chinese.62 The pros-
pect of localizing the civil service, in keeping with the PRC's slogan 
S7 R. ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 223. 
ss Macau '87, supra note II, at 182. 
S9 Jd. 
60 Hsiung, What Kind of Problems Will Macao Face During the Transitional Period?, MING 
PAO MONTHLY, Apr. 1987, at 29. See also ALMANAC OF MACAO'S EcONOMY, supra note 20, at 40-
41. 
61 Misquitta, Macao, in AsiA AND PACIFIC REVIEW 1986, at 149 (1986). 
62 /d.; Hsiung, supra note 60, at 28. 
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"Macao run by Macao people," will thus be very difficult. Hence, Portu-
gal thought it would be better to return Macao to the PRC after 2000 in 
order to gain more time to develop a local administration. 
Besides the aforementioned reasons, there was another practical and 
very important economic consideration. Portugal believed that it would 
benefit financially if Macao were not returned to the PRC right after the 
PRC takeover of Hong Kong. Apprehensive Hong Kong businessmen 
might transfer capital and investments from Hong Kong to Macao if the 
Portuguese were to keep Macao for decades after 1997.63 
The PRC, on the other hand, had two main rationales for wanting 
to recover sovereignty over Macao and Hong Kong at the same time in 
1997. First, Beijing did not want to regain Macao before 1997 for fear of 
jeopardizing the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Secondly, Bei-
jing was anxious to settle the Hong Kong and Macao issues simultane-
ously in order to set the stage for its main objective-reunification of 
Taiwan with mainland China. 64 Beijing wanted to use the Hong Kong 
and Macao models under the principle of "one country, two systems" as 
good examples for incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC. 65 
The first three rounds of negotiations between Lisbon and Beijing 
were deadlocked over the question of the date for transfer of Macao. 
Eleven days before the third round of talks, Dr. Joaquim Pinto Machado, 
Governor of Macao, stated in a radio broadcast that "it is completely 
impossible to coincide the date when Macao will return to China with 
the one chosen for Hong Kong. . .. Macao does not have the dimension 
and development of Hong Kong . . . . It will be a problem much more 
complex. "66 
The Portuguese continued to be well aware that Lisbon's best card 
in the talks was the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, which the 
PRC risked jeopardizing if Portugal pulled out of Macao prematurely. 
Macao officials had threatened to use the unilateral pullout card twice. 
In August 1985, Governor Vasco de Almeida e Costa asserted that the 
PRC had spoken too much about taking back Macao at the same time as 
Hong Kong in 1997. "Must we go to the negotiating table to take the 
Chinese orders because China is such a powerful country?" asked Costa. 
"Maybe we cannot wait for 12 years. We can leave within one or two 
years," Costa warned.67 After the second round of talks in September 
1986, Secretary for Economics, Finance and Tourism Carlos Monjardino 
63 Reaves, China Sets its Sights on Taking Taiwan, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 31, 1987, at 6. 
64 /d. 
6S See Beijing Sets the Stage for the Main Event, S. China Morning Post, Mar. 27, 1987, at 22. 
66 Governor Says 1997 Return to PRC 'impossible' (Hong Kong AFP, Oct. 10, 1986), reprinted 
in F.B.I.S., Oct. 10, 1986, at W4. 
67 Lau, A Ponuguese Farewell, FAR E. EcoN. REV., Aug. 22, !985, at 16. See also Macau '87, 
supra note II, at 182. 
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made the same threat: "We will withdraw [from Macau] early if we are 
not happy about the way things go. We have nothing to lose and we 
don't want to lose face. " 68 The Portuguese view was that the problems of 
returning Macao to the PRC were "completely different" from that of 
Hong Kong and therefore the issues should be kept separate. 69 
Zhou Nan, the PRC's Vice-Foreign Minister and chief of its negoti-
ation team, visited Lisbon on November 17-22, 1986. Portugal insisted 
that Zhou make this visit in order for its highest authorities to convey 
Portugal's message to the PRC on the question of the transfer date as 
well as the nationality issue.70 No agreement was reached, however, dur-
ing Zhou's visit. Beijing realized, nevertheless, Lisbon's sensitivity to-
ward these two issues. A compromise solution was offered by the PRC 
at the end of November 1986.71 Ma Man Kee, chairman of Macao's 
General Chamber of Commerce and a local representative of the Na-
tional Peopie's Congress (NPCf2 of the PRC, stated on November 30, 
1986 that the handover of Macao "will not be later than the year 2000, 
probably between 1997 ... and the end of the century.'m On December 
9, 1986 Ma again indicated that the PRC was determined to reach its 
reunification objectives concerning Hong Kong and Macao by the end of 
the century.74 
The Portuguese were not ready, however, to accept Beijing's timeta-
ble. Antonio Barreto, a socialist deputy in the Portuguese Parliament 
and a close advisor to President Mario Soares, said in a December 29, 
1986 interview that a unilateral declaration of 2007 or 2017 as the date of 
return was possible. 75 His remarks, broadcast by Macao's radio and tele-
vision stations, drew strong reaction from the PRC. On December 31, 
1986 the PRC Foreign Ministry said that "it is the unshakable and firm 
stand and the firm desire of the Chinese government and the 1 billion 
Chinese people, including our compatriots in Macao, to recover Macao 
68 Macau '87, supra note II, at 182. 
69 /d. 
70 Macao, PRC Dispute Status of Ethnic Chinese, Sunday Standard, Nov. 30, 1986, at I, re-
printed in F.B.l.S., Dec. 4, 1986, at W8. 
71 Macao-PRC Draft Agreement Expected by February (Hong Kong AFP, Nov. 30, 1986), re-
printed in F.B.I.S., Dec. 4, 1986, at W7. 
72 The National People's Congress is the "highest organ of state under the leadership of the 
[Chinese Communist Party] CCP and the only organ exercising the legislative power of the state." 
COMPREHENSIVE GLOSSARY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TERMINOLOGY 83 (Kuo ed. 1978). 
73 Macao-PRC Draft Agreement Expected by February, supra note 71, at W7. 
74 Macao Businessmen on Sino-Portuguese Talks, Zhongguo Tongxun She, Dec. 9, 1986, re-
printed in F.B.i.S., Dec. iO, i 986, at W 1. 
75 PRC, Portugal Disagree on Date For Macao's Return, supra note 52, at WI; Borralho, Beijing 
Reacts to Barreto's Remarks on Transfer, Hong Kong Standard, Jan. I, 1987, at I, reprinted in 
F.B.I.S, Jan. 6, 1987, at WI. 
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before the year 2000. " 76 The PRC stated that any proposal to return 
Macao subsequent to that year cannot be accepted. 77 
Portugal finally was convinced that Beijing would not make any fur-
ther concession on the transfer date question. ln early January 1987, 
Portugal's State Council, an advisory body, met for four hours to discuss 
the future of Macao. 78 President Soares and Prime Minister Cacaco 
Silva presented full reports on negotiations with the PRC. It was re-
ported on January 7, 1987 that Portuguese authorities concluded that the 
transfer of Macao by the year 2000 was unavoidable, but the exact date 
was not selected. 79 
Once Portugal decided to return Macao prior to 2000, negotiations 
between Beijing and Lisbon again gained momentum. During the fourth 
round of talks in March 1987, both sides agreed that December 20, 1999 
would be the date to transfer Macao to the PRC. It was reported that 
initially both sides selected December 31, 1999 as the transfer uate. But 
later the PRC was afraid that should anything go wrong on December 
31, a holiday, the PRC would not realize its goal of settling both the 
Hong Kong and Macao issues before the end of the century. So, an ear-
lier date, December 20, 1999, was chosen instead.80 
C Negotiation on the Nationality Issue 
The second difficult issue during the Macao negotiations was the 
nationality question. Portugal allows dual nationality making any holder 
of a Portuguese passport a national. 81 According to the PRC Nationality 
Law, however, no Chinese nationals are permitted to hold dual national-
ity.82 There are approximately 100,000 ethnic Chinese in Macao holding 
Portuguese passports-about one-fifth of Macao's population. 83 More-
over, unlike the United Kingdom, Portugal has only one type of nation-
ality which grants the right of entry and abode in Portugal and also 
provides consular services and protection. In 1981, the United Kingdom 
76 Borralho, supra note 75, at WI. 
77 /d. 
78 Administration To Revert To PRC Before 2000 (Hong Kong AFP, Jan. 7, !987), reprinted in 
F.B.l.S., Jan. 7, 1987, at WI. 
79 PRC Threat 'to Annex' Macao (Hong Kong AFP, Jan. 9, 1987), reprinted in F.B.l.S., Jan. 
12, 1987, at W2. 
80 Ming Pao, Mar. 24, 1987, at 2. 
81 Lin, Nationality Issue Troubles Macanese Portuguese, Pai Shing, July 16, 1985, at 51 (citing 
the 1981 new Nationality Law of Portugal (art. 27) which allows dual or multi nationalities). 
82 Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, arts. 3,8, reprinted in COMPILATION OF 
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1979-1984 at 200-01 (1985). 
83 Administration to Revert to PRC Before 2000, supra note 78, at WI; see also Misquitta, supra 
note 61, at 149; Portugal Seeks Concessions in Macao Talks (Hong Kong AFP, Mar. 19, 1987), 
reprinted in F.B.I.S., Mar. 19, 1987, at W4. 
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the PRC. 89 
Because the United Kingdom will not allow Hong Kong residents 
who hold British passports to continue to have the right of entry and 
abode after 1997, there is no dual nationality problem. The PRC has 
shown great flexibility in allowing the use of travel documents outside of 
Hong Kong and the PRC. As a result, no major confrontation has taken 
place between London and Beijing on the question of nationality. 
The Macao situation, however, was different in that Portugal was 
not willing to make the sort of arrangement the British did in its 1981 
Nationality Act, nor was Portugal prepared to create another type of 
nationality to solve the problems in Macao.90 Politically, it would have 
hurt the Portuguese government to change the status of nationals hold-
ing Portuguese passports. Portugal has had a policy of accepting refu-
gees from former colonies as nationals, and these nationals would 
become suspicious if the status of passport holders with similar colonial 
backgrounds were to lose some of their rights.91 Additionally, Portu-
guese negotiators were not able to make such a concession even if they 
had so wished since parliamentary approval is required to change the 
nationality laws. 92 That approval was not likely to be forthcoming, as 
the government feared instability would be created by any changes in 
their nationality laws. This was one of the reasons why the Portuguese 
invited Zhou Nan to Lisbon in November 1986.93 According to reliable 
sources from Portugal, President Soares and Prime Minister Silva 
wanted to explain the domestic difficulties to the PRC chief negotiator in 
person.94 
One of the Portuguese objectives during the negotiations was to pre-
serve Portugal's national dignity.95 By allowing its citizens and their de-
scendants the right of abode in Portugal and consular protection as any 
other Portuguese nationals, Lisbon's international image would thus be 
strengthened. 96 Portugal is not prepared, however, to accommodate a 
possible flood of refugees into Portugal from Macao.97 It was important, 
therefore, for the Portuguese to reach an agreement with the PRC to 
89 /d. 
90 Macao. PRC Dispute Status of Ethnic Chinese, supra note 70, at W8. 
91 /d. 
92 /d. 
93 /d. 
94 /d. 
9S Macao Residents' Concerns (Lisbon Domestic Service, Mar. 20, 1987), reprinted in F.B.I.S., 
Mar. 23, 1987, at W4. 
96 Lin, Macao Has Problems Which Remain to be Resolved, PAl SHING, Mar. 16, 1987, at 38. 
97 Portuguese President's Press Interview, supra note 41, at 7 (on May 23, 1985, President Eanes 
stated in an interview in Beijing that the "Portuguese government does not foresee a large scale of 
immigrants (from Macao to Portugal). At the beginning of the changing of administration, of 
course, this may be a problem, but I do not believe there will be many Macao-bom Chinese who are 
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maintain the status quo in Macao, while preserving the rights of Portu-
guese citizens in Macao. 
After Portugal made the concession in January 1987 to return Ma-
cao before the year 2000, the nationality problem became the only re-
maining issue requiring extensive negotiation between Beijing and 
Lisbon. The fourth round of talks between Lisbon and Beijing began 
March 18, 1987. Portugal reiterated its position with respect to dual na-
tionality during the talks. 98 The PRC, on the other hand, demanded one 
citizenship-Chinese-for the inhabitants of Macao.99 It was reported 
that at one point Portuguese negotiators threatened to walk out unless an 
agreement to their satisfaction was reached. 100 A compromise solution 
was finally worked out on March 23, 1987. 101 
Because of the radically different positions held by Lisbon and Bei-
jing on the question of nationality, two separate memoranda were issued, 
as in the Sino-British accord. The PRC side declared: 
The inhabitants in Macao who come under the provisions of the 
Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China, whether they are 
holders of the Portuguese travel or identity documents or not, have 
Chinese citizenship. Taking account of the historical background of 
Macao and its realities, the competent authorities of the Government 
of the People's Republic of China will permit Chinese nationals in Ma-
cao previously holding Portuguese travel documents to continue to use 
these documents for travelling to other states and regions after the es-
tablishment of the Macao Special Administrative Region. The above-
mentioned Chinese nationals will not be entitled to Portuguese consu-
lar protection in the Macao Special Administrative Region and other 
parts of the People's Republic of China. 102 
Portugal declared its position in its Memorandum on the question of 
nationality and passports, as follows: "In conformity with the Portu-
guese legislation, the inhabitants in Macao who, having Portuguese citi-
zenship, are holders of a Portuguese passport on December 19, 1999 may 
continue to use it after this date. No person may acquire Portuguese 
citizenship as from December 20, 1999 by virtue of his or her connection 
with Macao." 103 
willing to immigrate to Portugal."). See also Administration to Revert to PRC Before 2000, supra 
note 78, at WI. 
98 Portugal Seeks Concessions in Macao Talks (Hong Kong AFP, Mar. 19, 1987), reprinted in 
F.B.I.S., Mar. 19, 1987, at W4. 
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100 Center Daily News, Mar. 23, 1987, at I. 
101 Press Communique, supra note 54, at W2; Macao Agreement to be Commended, supra note 
13, at W3. 
102 Macao Joint Declaration, supra note 8, Exchange of Memoranda, Chinese Memoranda. 
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Although the PRC will only recognize Chinese passports after Ma-
cao returns to the PRC on December 20, 1999, Beijing will not strip 
Macao residents of their Chinese nationality if they are holding Portu-
guese passports. 104 Portugal gained more concessions on the nationality 
issue than the British had gained. A primary reason for these conces-
sions was that Beijing was more anxious than Lisbon to reach an agree-
ment on Macao. Studies have shown that subjects facing a high degree of 
pressure to reach agreement have had a higher concession rate and have 
reached agreement more often than those subjects facing a low degree of 
pressure to reach agreement. 105 Beijing was under pressure to conclude 
the Macao agreement for the following reasons. 
1. Domestic Instability in the PRC 
In January 1987, General Secretary Hu Yaobang resigned from his 
post following a series of student demonstrations for greater political 
freedom. Hu's forced resignation marked renewed party infighting be-
tween conservatives and moderate reformers. Premier Zhao Ziyang be-
came acting party leader in January 1987. 106 
PRC leaders had hoped to conclude the Macao settlement within a 
short period of time since this would indicate that their policies worked 
and that they could provide strong leadership. A few days before the 
first round of talks, Zhou Nan optimistically announced his belief that 
resolution of the Macao issue would be accomplished with more speed 
and cooperation than the Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong 
issue. 107 In November 1986, Beijing was hoping to reach an agreement 
with Lisbon before January 1, 1987, or at the latest in February 1987 to 
coincide with the celebration of the 8th anniversary of Sino-Portuguese 
normalization of relations. 108 
If an agreement was reached, according to the PRC Constitution, it 
would have to be endorsed by the NPC, 109 which was scheduled to hold 
its fifth session in March 1987. The PRC leaders apparently were anx-
ious to submit the Macao accord at this meeting, because a joint declara-
tion based on the "one country, two systems" principle would have 
greatly strengthened Deng Xiaoping's leadership position. It is clear that 
104 Macao Agreement to be Commended, supra note 13, at W3. 
lOS Hamner, Effects of Bargaining Strategy and Pressure to Reach Agreement in a Stalemated 
Negotiation, 30 J. OF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 464 (1974). 
106 Southerland, Chinese Leaders Gather to Map National Strategy, Wash. Post, Aug. 8, 1987, 
at A24. 
107 Qi, Sino-Portuguese Talks in Prospect, Zhongguo Tongxun She, June 25, 1986, reprinted in 
F.B.I.S., June 26, 1986, at WS. 
108 Lin, Are Sino-Portuguese Negotiations on the Macao Issue Mutually Willing?, PAl SHING, 
Apr. I, 1987, at 13. 
109 XtANFA (Constitution) art. 62 (People's Republic of China). 
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the Portuguese understood very well the domestic political struggle in 
the PRC. "Zhao Ziyang needs an agreement and we are using that to get 
last-minute concessions," informed Portuguese sources said. 110 Zhao 
Ziyang sought to use a joint declaration as proof to the NPC that the 
PRC's open-door policy was successful and Portugal took advantage of 
that fact. 111 
2. Domestic Instability in Portugal 
Besides their own domestic political considerations, PRC leaders 
also considered the potentially unstable domestic politics in Portugal 
when they made decisions on the Macao issue. One source of instability 
is the diffusion of power between the prime minister and the president. 
According to the 1976 Portuguese Constitution, it is the prime minister 
and cabinet that conducts internal and external affairs, except in cases 
where constitutionally the parliament must intervene. The president has 
no executive powers. 112 Practice has been otherwise, however, and this 
heightens the instability. 113 
A second source of instability is illustrated by the fact that during 
the last fourteen years, there have been sixteen changes in government. 114 
One government lasted only sixteen days. 115 There are four major par-
ties in Portugal, plus a number of smaller parties. 116 The structure of the 
electoral system makes it difficult to obtain an absolute majority. 117 No 
party had managed to gain a clear electoral majority before July 1987. 118 
Consequently, no prime minister was able to function with any solid par-
liamentary support. Portugal has been governed by coalition or minority 
governments for many years with a turnover in government every eleven 
months on the average. 119 This turnover in leadership placed pressure on 
the PRC to quickly conclude any negotiations with Portugal before a 
new government stepped in and the process had to begin over again. 
It was no surprise, then, that Zhou Nan raised the Macao issue with 
newly elected President Mario Soares during his visit to Lisbon in March 
1986. It was not until the end of June, however, that negotiations began. 
ItO Portugal Seeks Concessions in Macao Talks, supra note 98, at W4. 
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112 Balsemao, The Constitution and Politics, in PORTUGAL IN THE 1980's 204 (K. Maxwell ed. 
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Throughout the talks, the PRC had been anxious to bring a quick end to 
the Macao question. Portugal, on the other hand, saw no reason to rush 
an agreement. 120 Because of domestic constraints, Portugal would have 
preferred no agreement to a bad agreement. For the same reason, Beijing 
would have preferred to conclude the Macao negotiation as soon as pos-
sible for fear that further delay might cause complications occasioned by 
the Portuguese political instability. 121 Under these circumstances, Lis-
bon gained more bargaining leverage vis-a-vis Beijing. 
Beijing's concern was not ill-founded. Prime Minister Silva's gov-
ernment fell on April 3, 1987 when Parliament passed a vote of no confi-
dence against his government by a slim margin. Accordingly, when Silva 
went to the PRC to sign the Joint Declaration, he was a "lame duck" 
prime minister. Silva was, nevertheless, very well treated by the PRC 
leaders during his stay. Beijing had hoped the Portuguese Parliament 
could approve the Sino-Portuguese agreement on Macao before it ad-
journed on June 15, 1987, but this turned out to be wishful thinking. On 
April 11, 1987, the Fifth Session of the Sixth NPC delegated the author-
ity to review and approve the Joint Declaration on Macao to the NPC 
Standing Committee. 122 The standing committee ended its 21st meeting 
on June 23, 1987 by approving the Joint Declaration. 
Meanwhile, in Portugal Anibal Cavaco Silva's Social Democratic 
Party won a landslide electoral victory on July 19, 1987 by winning 50% 
of the vote and 148 of the 250 seats in the National assembly-Portugal's 
first majority government with the greatest assurance of completing a 
four-year term since 1974. 123 The Joint Declaration was ratified by the 
Parliament on December 11, 1987. 124 
IV. BEIJING'S NEGOTIATING TACTICS 
The conventional perception of the process of negotiating is rather 
simplistic: the parties involved sit at a bargaining table and exchange 
promises, commitments, bluffs, threats, warnings, rewards, proposals, 
and counterproposals through which they will either resolve their differ-
ences and reach an agreement or abort the negotiations. 125 The negotiat-
ing process in reality, however, is much more complex. Formal 
bargaining at the negotiating table is only a part of the process. Propa-
120 Long, Will the Macao Question Soon Be Settled?, THE NtNETIES, Jan. 1984, at 39. 
121 Lin, Zhou Nan's Trip to Portugal Did Not Bring Expected Effects, PAl SHING, Dec. 16, 
1986, at 36. 
122 People's Daily, Apr. 12, 1987, at I. 
123 Wise, supra note 114, at A9. 
124 Lin, Portuguese Parliament Approved the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration, PAl SHING, 
Jan. I, 1988, at 38. 
125 Colosi, A Model for Negotiation and Mediation, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 16 (D. 
Bendahmane & J. McDonald, Jr. eds. 1984). 
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ganda, maneuvers of public opinion, mass media, informal exchanges of 
ideas, for example, are also important parts of the negotiating process. 
During the Macao negotiations, Beijing has used the following tac-
tics to strengthen its bargaining leverage vis-a-vis Lisbon. 
A. Pre-Negotiation Maneuvers 
How to set the stage and the rules of the game for formal negotia-
tions is, perhaps, as important as negotiating itself. Before the formal 
negotiations began on the Macao issue in June 1986, the PRC had re-
peatedly stated its "non-negotiable" demands with respect to the transfer 
date (first in 1997, then, before 2000) and the nationality issue in order to 
persuade the Portuguese of the firmness of the Chinese "bottom line." 
1. Nonnegotiable Demands 
Postulation of nonnegotiable demands as a negotiating tactic has 
been used very frequently by the PRC. 126 In order to establish an agenda 
favorable to its objectives, the PRC would seek to establish its "nonnego-
tiable conditions" at the outset of a negotiation through leaks, formal 
statements by officials, or by less formal channels. On the Hong Kong 
question, PRC officials have successfully used the tactic of pre-negotia-
tion disclosure of the PRC's nonnegotiable demands in order to gain 
favorable negotiating leverage with the British. 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visited the PRC on Sep-
tember 22-25, 1982. Before Premier Zhao Ziyang's scheduled meeting 
with Mrs. Thatcher, he disclosed the PRC position to reporters, as fol-
lows: "Of course China will recover sovereignty over Hong Kong. But I 
think the question of sovereignty will not influence Hong Kong's pros-
perity and stability." 127 The public disclosure of what would later be 
offered in private was meant to convey the steadfastness of the PRC's 
position. 128 Deng Xiaoping was reported to have told Mrs. Thatcher 
that Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong was not open for negotiation. 
The Chinese would not accede to anything less than the removal of the 
British flag and the British govemor. 129 
Beijing used the same tactic on the Macao issue in 1986. Why does 
the PRC use the tactic of postulating "non-negotiable" demands prior to 
negotiation? Chester L. Karrass has made the following observation re-
garding nonnegotiable demands: 
126 See, e.g., Solomon, Friendship and Obligation in Chinese Negotiating Styles, in NATIONAL 
NEGOTIATING STYLES 4-8 (H. Binnendijk ed. 1987); L. PYE, CHINESE COMMERCIAL NEGOTIAT· 
lNG STYLE x-xi, 20-23, 72-73, 95 (1982). 
127 F. CHING, supra note 12, at II. 
128 /d. 
129 /d. 
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Nonnegotiable demands are demands so extreme that compro-
mise appears virtually impossible. At stake are deep-rooted values 
The strange thing about nonnegotiable demands is that they can 
help a negotiator rally his own people at the same time that he diffuses 
the opposition. By making extreme demands a negotiator can demon-
strate his conviction. ... 
Non-negotiable demands lower the expectations of an opponent. 
They make him more willing to compromise somewhere rather than 
risk so serious a confrontation of values. 130 
It is clear that establishing nonnegotiable demands is part of the 
PRC's bargaining style. The United Kingdom finally yielded on the is-
sues of sovereignty and administrative rights of Hong Kong. Portugal 
also gave in and agreed to return Macao to the PRC before the year 
2000. The PRC, however, compromised with Portugal on the nationality 
issue. Accordingly, Richard H. Solomon has commented: "when Chi-
nese officials want to reach a specific agreement they will set aside their 
stress on principle and reach a concrete understanding that in fact may 
have little relation to--or may even seem to contravene-the principles 
they stressed early in the negotiation." 131 
2. United Front Campaign 
To the Chinese Communists, the so-called united front strategy 
"means forming an alliance with all the forces that can be 'united,' or-
ganizing them into a camp of 'uniformity,' and then employing all possi-
ble means of struggle against the enemy." 132 Beijing has taken the 
following measures to drive a wedge through the opposition: 
a. Enlarging Macao's Representatives in the PRC 
In February 1983, during the Hong Kong negotiations, Beijing en-
larged the representation of Hong Kong and Macao residents by 140 
members in its legislative organ, the NPC, and its corollary, the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (which while providing con-
sultative services, carries no real power). 133 In addition, the PRC also 
enlarged the number of seats for Macao "compatriots" in the 
Guangdong Provincial People's Congress by adding five appointees and 
also in the Guangdong Political Consultative Conference where four 
seats were added. These new members differed from their established 
130 C. KARRASS, GIVE AND TAKE 127 (1984). 
131 Solomon, supra note 126, at 4. 
132 Wu, Can the Hong Kong Settlement Serve As A Model For Taiwan?, in THE FUTURE OF 
HONG KONG, supra note 10, at 157. 
133 F. CHING, supra note 12, at 13. 
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counterparts. They were younger (aged 30-50) and came from a wider 
cross-section of the pro-PRC Macao community, including heads of 
sporting associations, trade unions, as well as school principals. 134 They 
were not public figures, but Beijing resorted to its united front strategy of 
isolating the primary antagonists by uniting them with as many other 
people as possible. 135 
The PRC also received delegations of all types from Macao and sent 
representatives to visit Macao. Guangdong Governor Liang Lingguang 
visited Macao in August 1983. In July 1983 and February 1987, Xu 
Jiatun, director of the Xinhua news agency in Hong Kong as well as 
China's unofficial ambassador in Hong Kong, visited Macao. During his 
stay, Xu met representatives from the Chinese community, praised them 
for their support of "reunification and modernization of the Mother-
land," and called for even greater cooperation in achieving these two 
goals. 136 Xu articulated nationalist and patriotic values in an attempt to 
unite Macao's people. He also promised Macao's prosperity and stability 
would continue under the principle of "one country, two systems." 137 
b. Publicizing the "One Country, Two Systems" Slogan 
The PRC has launched an extensive propaganda campaign consist-
ing of the "scientific" and "strategic" nature of the "one country, two 
systems" principle. 138 The campaign was proclaimed as reflecting the 
"patriotic united front during the new historical period."139 A May 26, 
1986 Beijing Review article promised that the Chinese government "will 
give full consideration to Macao's history and present situation," and 
that the Macao issue "will be solved to the satisfaction of all parties con-
cerned" according to the concept of "one country, two systems."140 
c. Wooing Public Opinion 
Besides receiving all kinds of delegations from Macao and sending 
various delegations to Macao, Beijing had also mounted a visible effort to 
build confidence among Macao's residents. China's official representa-
tive in Macao, Nam Kwong Company, collected public opinion by tele-
134 Macau '84, supra note 42, at 208. 
135 /d. 
136 Lin, Xu Jiatun's New Year Visiting to Macao, PAl SHING, Feb. 16, 1987, at 49-51. 
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phone shortly before the talks were to begin. 141 Some may· wonder 
whether this sampling was truly indicative of public opinion, as the local 
residents may not have freely expressed their reservations to a commu-
nist organization. The majority of Macao residents were politically apa-
thetic, mainly because they felt powerless. 14,2 
B. Tactics Used During Negotiations 
1. Beijing as the Negotiating Location 
Richard Solomon has pointed out that: "The Chinese prefer to ne-
gotiate on their own territory for being at home aids internal communi-
cations, decision-making and their orchestration of the ambiance of 
negotiations from banquet toasts to the manipulation of the press." 143 
On the Hong Kong and Macao issues, the PRC selected Beijing as the 
negotiating location for several purposes. The PRC thought of Hong 
Kong and Macao as Chinese territory; therefore, negotiations should be 
on China's soil. 144 The United Kingdom had no objection-all twenty-
two rounds of talks between the PRC and Britain took place in Beijing. 
Portugal, however, did not want to repeat what it considered the 
humiliating experience of Britain. Portugal wanted to rotate the negoti-
ating locations between Beijing and Lisbon on each occasion. 145 The 
PRC disagreed. A compromise was reached, however, in that Zhou Nan 
would visit Lisbon in return for Portugal's agreement to negotiate the 
Macao settlement in Beijing. 146 The PRC declared, however, the pur-
pose of Zhou's visit was not for talks on the Macao issue, but for "a 
good-will visit." 147 
Besides the historic reasons, PRC leaders also wanted to impress 
Portuguese negotiators with the greatness of Chinese culture, by includ-
ing banquet cuisine and sightseeing trips. Solomon believes that these 
aspects of the negotiating process are often used by the PRC in order to 
create a sense of China's "great tradition and future potential-and in 
partial compensation for its current political and economic weakness." 148 
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144 Lin, Practical Contradictions Between China and Portugal Are Ambiguous, PAt SHING, July 
16, 1986, at 42. 
145 Portuguese President's Press Interview, supra note 41, at 9. 
146 Lin, supra note 121, at 35. 
147 PRC Vice Foreign Minister on Macao Issue (Xinhua, Nov. 23, 1986), reprinted in F.B.I.S., 
Dec. I, 1986, at W4. 
148 Solomon, supra note 126, at :&. See also Shiung, Will Sino-Portuguese Talks Be Peaceful?, 
THE MIRROR, 1987, at 21 (citing that during the Macao negotiations, Portuguese negotiators were 
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2. Time Pressure: Deadline 
A major negotiating tactic often used by the PRC is the effort to use 
time pressures against an adversary. 149 Beijing has successfully applied 
time pressures and deadlines against the United Kingdom on the Hong 
Kong issue. On the Macao issue, however, it was the PRC-not Portu-
gal-that was vulnerable to time pressures. 
Beijing takes advantage of an adversary's anxiety to conclude a 
given deal. 150 A deadline is, actually, one of the most frequently used 
tactics in negotiation. As one commentator states: deadlines "force ac-
tion" and "pressure people into making an either-or choice." 151 
There are several advantages in manipulating deadlines. First, a 
sense of urgency can be created. 152 Second, deadlines can be used to 
deny your opponent time to gather sufficient knowledge and insight for 
making sound judgments. 153 Third, a deadline gives the impression that 
you are ready to deal. 154 Deadlines, properly executed, are effective from 
the lowest to the highest level of negotiation. 155 According to Karrass, 
"[e]xperience tells us that some deadlines mean dead, others not. Some 
are costly, others inconsequential."156 
One of the tactics Beijing used during Hong Kong negotiations was 
to impose a deadline in order to persuade London to concede on the 
sovereignty and administration issues. There were two stages of the 
Hong Kong negotiations. The first stage of the negotiations took place in 
1982-83 and was characterized by impasse or deadlock. 157 The PRC in-
sisted that Britain give up sovereignty and administrative rights on Hong 
Kong. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, wanted to receive con-
tinuing British administration in exchange for acknowledging Beijing's 
sovereignty over Hong Kong. 
Throughout the first stage of the negotiations, Hong Kong's finan-
cial and economic conditions deteriorated and the Hong Kong dollar 
steadily declined in value. This was an indication of the lack of public 
morale brought about by the deadlock. The third round of talks took 
place August 2-3, 1983 and there was still no progress, 158 and the fourth 
invited by the PRC for sightseeing trips after each round of talks in Beijing. They had visited the 
Chengde Summer Palace, Shandong and Yangtse River). 
149 Solomon, supra note 126, at 13. 
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lSI C. KARRASS, supra note 130, at 44-45. 
IS2 0. LEWIS, POWER NEGOTIATING TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 53 (1981). 
1S3 Jd. 
IS4 /d. at 54. 
ISS /d. at 55. 
IS6 C. KARRASS, supra note 130, at 45. 
IS7 THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG, supra note 10, at 7. 
ISS F. CHING, supra note 12, at 17. 
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round was held on September 22-23, 1983. Meanwhile, the Hong Kong 
stock market continued to drop, the index falling 65.58 points to 
785.48. 159 In late September 1983, Hong Kong's dollar also plummeted 
in value against the American dollar-the greatest fall in its history. 160 
In the middle of this financial crisis, the PRC disclosed its intention 
to announce its own plans for the future of Hong Kong, if an agreement 
with the United Kingdom could not be reached by September 1984. 161 
By unilaterally imposing a deadline, the PRC dramatized the likelihood 
of a breakdown in negotiations and heightened the risk of further deterio-
ration of the Hong Kong economy. In addition, Deng Xiaoping was re-
ported to have said that the PRC would not give in regardless of how far 
the Hong Kong dollar dropped. 162 Premier Zhao also said, "No country 
can put prosperity ahead of sovereignty." 163 
Against this background the United Kingdom became convinced of 
the firmness of Beijing's position. London finally decided to give in. The 
White Paper on Hong Kong, published in September 1984 as the "Draft 
Agreement", points out that "[t]he alternative to acceptance of the pres-
ent agreement is to have no agreement. In this case the Chinese Govern-
ment has made it plain that negotiations could not be reopened and that 
it would publish its own plan for Hongkong." 164 
The deadline tactic used by the PRC was apparently very effective. 
The British concession marked the most significant breakthrough in the 
Hong Kong negotiations. The fifth round of talks ended on October 20, 
1983, the phrases ·~useful and constructive" reappeared in the press com-
munique after the talks. 165 
In the Macao negotiation, Beijing was pressured to reach an agree-
ment with Portugal because of domestic consideration in both countries. 
Portugal, on the other hand, had no pressure to meet any deadlines. 
During the deadlock period over the transfer date issue, Zhou Nan 
was reported to have threatened Portugal with annexation of Macao 
should Lisbon not agree to return Macao prior to the year 2000. This 
threat was reportedly made to Portuguese Foreign Minister Pedro Pires 
de Miranda during Zhou Nan's visit to Lisbon in November 1986. 166 
The PRC, however, denied the report. "[T]here was never an ultimatum 
or any threat of annexation," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said. 167 
IS9 /d. at 19. 
160 /d. 
161 /d. at 20. 
162 /d. at 17. 
163 /d. 
164 Hong Kong, AsiA 1985 YEARBOOK 146-47 (1985). 
16S F. CHING, supra note 12, at 21. 
166 PRC Threat 'to Annex' Macao, supra note 79, at W2. 
167 /d. 
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Regardless of whether this threat was made, it was the PRC which 
was anxious to reach a quick agreement on the Macao question. Portu-
gal, because of domestic uncertainty, would have preferred no agreement 
to a bad agreement on the Macao issue. Indeed, it was Lisbon which 
made repeated threats to pull out of Macao prior to 1997. Beijing, there-
fore, was in a less advantageous position to bargain with Portugal. It is 
no surprise that the PRC ultimately made a concession on the nationality 
issue. 
3. Making Concessions in the Eleventh Hour 
The PRC leaders are masters of eleventh-hour negotiations, but if 
the adversary persists and waits patiently and if Beijing needs an agree-
ment badly, the PRC will make final concessions in order to conclude an 
arrangement. 
There are several advantages in making concessions toward the end 
of negotiations. First, it makes the receiving party more appreciative of 
the concessions. 168 Second, one can test the other side's limits before 
making important concessions. 
Beijing tends to make concessions at the last minute of negotiations. 
On the nationality issue, for example, the PRC did not acquiesce to Por-
tugal's "dual nationality" demand until the last day of negotiations. In 
addition, Beijing tends to make concessions on less vital issues, while 
demanding an adversary to yield on the most important issues according 
to its "non-negotiable" principle. 
C Post-Negotiation Maneuvers 
Many foreign negotiators comment that the PRC does not believe 
that reaching an agreement means the end of negotiations. 169 The Chi-
nese may seek modifications of formal agreements or reopen issues if it 
serves their interests. 170 
On the Macao issue, it was not clear how Beijing would implement 
the "dual nationality" provision. Macao residents holding Portuguese 
passports are now free to live in Portugal. Portugal is now a member 
state of the European Economic Community (EEC). As a consequence, 
there are restrictions on free movement of Portuguese to other EEC 
states, but these will be lifted in the 1990s. 171 There are concerns, there-
fore, among the EEC countries that migrating Portuguese workers may 
increase rapidly once they have free access to the EEC states. It was 
168 C. KARRASS, supra note 130, at 39. 
169 Solomon, supra note 126, at 14. 
170 /d. at 14-15. 
171 Lau, Bending the Law, FAR E. EcON. REV., Apr. 30, 1987, at 36-37; Lau & Bowring, 
Passing the Passpon, FAR E. EcON. REV., Aug. 22, 1985, at 14-16. 
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reported that Britain, .other EEC states and the PRC may pressure Por-
tugal to change its nationality law before 1999 to make it more difficult 
for Chinese in Macao to acquire Portuguese citizenship. 172 
Negotiations of the Hong Kong Basic Law since the conclusion of 
the Joint Declaration show that Beijing has "second thoughts" regarding 
parts of the agreement reached in September 1984. For example, the 
PRC declares in the Joint Declaration that the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region "will enjoy a high degree of autonomy" and "will be 
vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power." 173 
The PRC apparently now wants more authority for the executive branch 
than for the legislative branch. 174 There are also disputes about the 
meaning of the words "high degree of autonomy." Because of China's 
willingness to ask for modifications, it is still too early to tell how Beijing 
will implement the "one-country, two systems" principle with regard to 
both Hong Kong and Macao. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that the Macao negotia-
tions and settlement were not woven by the PRC from the same cloth as 
the Hong Kong agreement. Despite the fact that the PRC initially 
sought settlement and return of both territories at the same time for the 
same reasons, and that some similarities are evident in the terms of the 
two agreements, we have seen that Macao was a "different kettle of fish" 
from Hong Kong. 
In comparison with what is already known about the Hong Kong 
settlement, it is clear that significant dissimilarities existed between Hong 
Kong and Macao. These distinct differences derived in part from local 
conditions peculiar to Macao and from domestic political concerns and 
developments within Portugal and the PRC, respectively. 
This analysis of the Macao case suggests four important conclusions 
about the PRC's negotiating style. 
1) The PRC will be flexible and pragmatic in making those conces-
sions it feels necessary to accomplish its objectives, even if this requires 
significant departure from precedent and previously stated positions. 
2) The PRC will engage in various pre-negotiation tactics compris-
ing: postulation of so-called "non-negotiable demands," the leaking of 
these, and the wooing of public opinion including utilization of various 
"united front" campaigns. 
3) The PRC will resort to various tactics during negotiation that 
172 Lau, supra note 171, at 36-37; Lau & Bowring, supra note 171, at 14-16. 
173 Hong Kong Joint Declaration, supra note 3, para. 3(2)-(3). 
174 Cheung, The Outline of the Draft of the Basic Law is Appearing, PAJ SHING, Dec. 16, 1987, 
at 3-S. 
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may include: insisting on Beijing as the negotiating location; using time 
pressure or deadline tactics; and deferring any concessions to the last 
moment. 
4) The PRC will also use a variety of post-negotiation maneuvers, 
such as seeking modifications or reopening negotiations on any issue that 
serve its interests. (Table 2) 
Negotiation 
Phases 
(1) Pre-negotiation Maneuvers 
(2) Tactics Used During 
Negotiation 
(3) Post-negotiation Maneuvers 
Table 2. 
Beijing's Negotiating Tactics 
on the Macao Issue 
(a) Non-negotiable Demands 
(b) United Front Campaign 
(a) Beijing as the Negotiating 
Location 
(b) Time Pressure: Deadline 
(c) Making Concessions in the 
Eleventh Hour 
(a) Modifications of Formal 
Understanding 
(b) Reopening Resolved Issues 
Finally, more research is required, particularly of the Macao case, 
before analysts can confidently make additional generalizations about the 
PRC's negotiating style that may be of predictive value for the Taiwan 
and other issues. · 
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APPENDICES 
P JWTOCOL between Portugal and China, respecting the 
Relations between the two Countries.-Signed at Lisbon, 
March :l6, 1887.• 
THE Government of His Most Faithful Majesty the King of 
Portugal and the Algarves, and that of His Imperial Majesty the 
Emperor of China, having decided to regulate the friendly relations 
existing for more than three centuries between the two countries, 
have agreed for this purpose to a preliminary Protocol. To this 
effect the Undersigned, Henrique de Ba.rros Gomes, of His Majesty's 
Council, his Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Knight Grand Cross of the Orders of Our Lord Jesus Christ, of 
the Legion of Honour, of Pius IX, of the Saints Maurice and 
Lazarus, of Charles III, and Leopold of Belgium, &c. ; and James 
Duncan Campbell, Commissioner and Non-Resident Secretary of 
the Inspectorate-General o£ Chinese Imperial Ma,ritime Customs, of 
Second Class Chinese. Civil Rank, with double Dragon decoration 
Second Division Second Class, Commander of the Legion of Honour, 
and Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael 
and Saint George, duly empowered by their respective Governments, 
hnve concluded the following Protocol:-
ART. I. .A. Treaty of Friendship nnd Commerce, with most-
favoured-nation clause, will be concluded and signed at Peking. 
II. China confirms perpetual occupation and· govemment of 
Macau and its dependencies by Portugal, as any other Portuguese 
Possession. 
III. Portugal engages never to alienate l\iacau and dependencies 
without agreement with .China. 
IV. Portugal engages to co-operate in opium revenue work at 
Macau in same way as England at Hong Kong. 
Done at Lisbon, the 26th March, 1887. 
(L.S.) HENRIQUE DE BARROS GOMES. 
(L.S.) JAMES DUNCAN CAMPBELL 
Signed also in the Portuguese language. 
Source: Clive Parry, ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 169 (1887), Dobbs Ferry 
Oceana Publications, 1978, p. 192. 
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Joint Declaration 
Of the Government of the People's Republic 
Of China and the Government of the 
Republic of Portugal on the Question 
Of Macao 
(Initialled Text) 
"'rhel ;overnment orthe.People's Republic or China 
I and the Government or the Republic of 
Portugal have reviewed with satisfaction the 
de,'elopment of the friendly relations between the 
two governments and peoples since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
two countries and agreed that a proper negotiated 
settlement by the two governments of the question 
of Macao. which is left over from the past. is 
conducive to the economic growth and social 
stability of Macao and to the further strengthening 
of the friendly relations and co-operation between 
the two countries. To this end. they have, after talks 
between the delegations of the two governments. 
agreed to declare as follows: 
I. The Government of the People's Republic of 
China and the Government of the Republic of 
Portugal declare that the Macao area (including the 
Macao Peninsula. Taipa Island and Coloane 
Island. hereinafter referred to as Macao) is Chinese 
territory. and that the Government of the People's 
Republic of China will resume the exercise of 
sovereignty over Macao with effect from December 
20. 1999. 
2. The Government of the People's Republic of 
China declares that in line with the principle of"one 
country. two systems." the People's Republic of 
China will pursue the following basic policies 
regarding Macao: 
(I) In accordance with the provisions of Article 
31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of 
China. the People's Republic of China will establish 
a Macao Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China upon resuming the 
exercise of sovereignty over Macao. 
(2) The Macao Special Administrative Region 
will be directly under the authority of the Central 
People's Government or the People's Republic of 
China. and will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, 
except in foreign and defence affairs which are the 
responsibilities of the Central People's Govern-
ment. The Macao Special Administrative Region 
will be vested with executive. legislative and 
independent judicial power. including that of final 
adjudication. 
(3) Both the government and the legislature of 
the Macao Special Administrative Region will be 
composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive 
will be appointed by the Central People's 
Government on the basis of the results of elections 
or consultations to be held in Macao. Officials 
holding principal posts will be nominated by the 
chief executive of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region for appointment by the Central People's 
Government. Public servants (including police) of 
Chinese nationality and Portuguese and other 
foreign nationalities previously serving in Macao 
may remain in employment. Portuguese and other 
foreign nationals may be appointed or employed to 
hold certain public posts in the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. 
(4) The current social and economic systems in 
Macao will remain unchan~~:ed. and so will the life-
style. The laws currently in force in Macao will 
remain basically unchanged. All rights and 
freedoms of the inhabitants and other persons in 
Macao. including those of the person. of speech. of 
Source: Beijing Review, Vol. 30, No. 14 (April 6, 1987), Document Insertion. 
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the press, of assembly. of association, of travel and 
movement, of strike. of choice of occupation, of 
academic research. of religion and belief. of 
communication and the ownership of property will 
be ensured by law in the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. 
(5) The Macao Special Administrative Region 
will on its own decide policies in the fields of culture. 
education. science and technology and protect 
cultural relics in Macao according to law. 
In addition to Chinese. Portuguese may also be 
used in organs of government and in the legislature 
and the courts in the Macao Special Administrative 
Region. 
(6) The Macao Special Administrative Region 
may establish mutually beneficial economic 
relations with Portugal and other countries. Due 
regard will be given to the economic interests of 
Portugal and other countries in Macao. The 
interests of the inhabitants of Portuguese descent in 
Macao will be protected by law. 
(7) Using the name "'Macao. China," the 
Macao Special Administrative Region may on its 
own maintain and develop economic and cultural 
relations and in this context conclude agreements 
with states, regions and relevant international 
organizations. 
The Macao. Special Administrative Region 
Government may on its own issue travel documents· 
for entry into and exit from Macao. 
(8) The Macao Special Administrative Region 
will remain a free port and a separate customs 
territory in order to develop its economic activities. 
There will be free flow of capital. The Macao 
pataca, as the legal tender of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region, will continue to circulate 
and remain freely convertible. 
(9) The Macao Special Administrative Region 
will continue to have independent finances. The 
Central Peoples Government will not levy taxes on 
the Macao Special Administrative Region. 
(10) The maintenance of public order in the 
Macao Special Administrative Region will be the 
responsibility of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region Government. 
(II) Apart from displaying the national flag 
and national emblem of the People's Republic of 
China, the Macao Special Administrative Region 
may use a regional flag and emblem of its own. 
( 12) The above-stated basic policies and the 
elaboration of them in Annex I to this Joint 
Declaration will be stipulated in a Basic Law of ihe 
Macao Special Administrative Region of the 
People:s Republic of China by the National 
People's Congress of the People's Republic of 
China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 years. 
3. The Government of the People's Republic of 
China and the Government of the Republic of 
Portugal declare that, during the transitional period 
between the date of the entry into force of this Joint 
Declaration and December 19. 1999, the 
Government of the Republic of Portugal will be 
responsible for the administration of Macao. The 
Government of the Republic of Portugal will 
continue to promote the economic growth of 
Macao and maintain its social stability, and the 
Government of the People's Republic of China will 
give its co-operation in this connection. 
4. The Government of the People's Republic of 
China and the Government of the Republic of 
Portugal declare that in order to ensure the effective 
implementation of this Joint Declaration anc create 
appropriate conditions for the transfer of 
government in 1999, a Sino-Portuguese Joint 
Liaison Group will be set up when this Joint 
Declaration enters into force. and that it will be 
esiablished and will function in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of Annex II to this Joint 
Declaration. 
5. The Government of the Peoples Republic of 
China and the Government of the Republic of 
Portugal declare that land leases in Macao and 
other related matters will be dealt with in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Annexes to this Joint Declaration. 
6. The Government of the Peoples Republic of 
China and the Government of the Republic of 
Portugal agree to implement all the preceding 
declarations and the Annexes which are a 
component part of the Joint Declaration. 
7. This Joint Declaration and its Annexes shall 
enter into force on the date of the exchange of 
instruments of ratification, which shall take place in 
Beijing. This Joint DeClaration and its Annexes 
shall be equally binding. 
Done in duplicate at Beijing on 1987 in the 
Chinese and Portuguese languages. both texts being 
equally authentic. 
(Signed on April 13, I 987) 
(Signed) 
For the Government of the 
People"s Republic of China 
(Signed) 
For the Government of the 
Republic of Portugal 
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Annex I 
Elaboration by the Government of the People's Republic 
Of China of Its Basic Policies Regarding Macao 
The Government of the People's Republic of 
I China elaborates the basic policies of the 
People's Republic of China regarding Macao as set 
out in paragraph 2 of the Joint Declaration of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China and 
the Government of the Republic of Portugal on the 
Question of Macao as follows: 
The Constitution of the People's Republic of 
China stipulates in Article 31 that "the state may 
establish special administrative regions when 
necessary. The systems to be instituted in special 
administrative regions shall be prescribed by laws 
enacted by the National People's Congress in the 
light of the specific conditions." In accordance w(th 
this Article. the People's Republic of China shall, 
upon the resumption of the exercise of sovereignty 
over Macao on December 20. 1999. establish the 
Macao Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China. The National People's 
Congress of the People's Republic of China shall 
enact and promulgate a Basic Law of the Macao 
Special Administrative Region of the People's 
Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the 
Basic Law) in accordance with the Constitution of 
the People's Republic of China, stipulating that 
after the establishment of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region the socialist system and 
socialist policies shall not be practised in the Macao 
Special Administrative Region and that the current 
social and economic systems and life-style in Macao 
shall remain unchanged for 50 years. 
The Macao Special Administrative Region 
shall be directly under the authority of the Central 
People's Government of the People's Republic of 
China. and shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. 
except in foreign and defence affairs which are the 
responsibilities of the Central People's Govern-
ment. The Macao Special Administrative Region 
shall be vested with executive. legislative and 
independent judicial power. including that of final 
adjudication. The Central People's Government 
shall authorize the Macao Special Administrative 
Region to conduct on its own those external affairs 
specified in Section VIII of this Annex. 
II 
The executive power of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region shall be vested in the 
government of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region. The government of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region shall be composed of local 
inhabitants. The chief executive of the Macao 
Special Administrative Region shall be appointed 
by the Central People's Government on the basis of 
the results of elections or consultations to be held in 
Macao. Officials holding principal posts (equiva-
lent to assistant-secretaries. procurator-general and 
principal officer of the police service) shall be 
nominated by the chief executive of the Macao 
Special Administrative Region for appointment by 
the Central People's Government. 
The executive authorities shall abide by the law 
and shall be accountable to the legislature. 
Ill 
The legislative power of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region shall be vested in the 
legislature of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region. The legislature shall be composed of local 
inhabitants. and the majority of its members shall 
be elected. · · 
After the establishment of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. the laws. decrees. 
administrative regulations and other normative acts 
previously in force in Macao shall be maintained. 
save for whatever therein may contravene the Basic 
Law or subject to any amendment by the Macao 
Special Administrative Region legislature. 
. The legislature of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region may enact laws in 
accordanc~ with the pro\'isions of the Basic Law 
and legal procedures. and such laws shall be re-
ported to the Standing Committee of the National 
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People's Congress of the People's Republic of 
China for the record. Laws enacted by the 
legislature of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region which are in accordance with the Basic Law 
and legal procedures shall be regarded as valid. 
The legal system of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region shall consist of the Basic 
Law. the Jaws previously in force in Macao and the 
Jaws enacted by the Macao Special Administrative 
Region as above. 
IV 
Judicial power in the Macao Special 
Administrative Region shall be vested in the courts 
·of the Macao Special Administrative Region. The 
power of final adjudication shall be exercised by the 
court of final appeal in the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. The courts shall exercise 
judicial power independently and free from any 
interference, and shall be subordinated only to the 
law. The judges shall enjoy the immunities 
appropriate to the performance of their functions. 
Judges of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region courts shall be appointed by the chief 
executive of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region acting in accordance with the recommend-
ation of the independent commission composed of 
local judges. lawyers and noted public figures. 
Judges shall be chosen by reference to their 
professional qualifications. Qualified judges of 
foreign nationalities may also be invited to serve as 
judges in the Macao Special Administrative Region. 
A judge may only be removed for inability to 
.discharge the functions of his office, or for 
behaviour incompatible with the post he holds, by 
the chief executive acting in accordance with the 
recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the 
president of the court of final appeal. consisting of 
no fewer than three local judges. The removal of 
judges of the court of final appeal shall be decided 
upon by the chief executive in accordanCe with the 
·recommendation of a review committee consisting 
of members of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region legislature. The appoin1ment and removal 
of judges of the court of final appeal shall be 
reported to the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress for the record. 
The prosecuting authority of the Macao 
Special Administrative Region shall exercise 
procuratorial functions as vested by Jaw, 
independently and free from any interference. 
The system previously in force in Macao for 
appointment and removal of supporting members 
of the judiciary shall be maintained. 
On the basis of the system previously operating 
in Macao, the Macao Special Administrative 
Region Government shall make provisions for local 
lawyers and lawyers from outside Macao to practise 
in the Macao Special Administrative Region. 
The Central People's Government shall assist 
or authorize the Macao Special Administrative 
Region Government to make appropriate 
arrangements for reciprocal juridical assistance 
with foreign states. 
v 
The Macao Special Administrative Region 
shall, according to Jaw, ensure the rights and 
freedoms of the inhabitants and other persons in 
Macao as provided for by the ·Jaws previously in 
Macao, including freedom of the person. of speech. 
of the press, of assembly. of demonstration, of 
association (e.g.. to form and join non-official 
associations), to form and join trade unions, of 
travel and movement, of choice of occupation and 
work. of strike, of religion and belief. of education 
and academic research: inviolability of the home 
and of communication, and the right to have access 
to Jaw and court: rights concerning the ownership of 
private property and of enterprises and their 
transfer and inheritance, and to obtain appropriate 
compensation for lawful deprivation paid without 
undue delay; freedom to marry and the right to 
form and raise a family freely. 
The inhabitants and other persons in the 
Macao Special Administrative Region shall all be 
equal before the law, and shall be free from 
discrimination, irrespective of nationality. descent. 
sex. race, language. religion, political or ideological 
belief, educational level, economic status or social 
conditions. 
The Macao Special Administrative Region 
shall protect, according to Jaw, the il)terests of 
residents of Portuguese descent in Macao and shall 
respect their customs and cultural traditions. 
Religious organizations and believers in the 
Macao Special Administrative Region may carry 
out activities as before for religious purposes and 
within the limits as prescribed by law, and may 
maintain relations with religious organizations and 
believers outside Macao. Schools. hospitals and 
charitable institutions attached to religious 
organizations may continue to operdte as before. 
The relationship between religious organizations in 
the Macao Special Administrative Region and 
those in other parts of the People's Republic of 
China· shall be based on the principles of non-
subordination, non-interference and mutual 
respect. · 
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VI 
After the establishment of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region, public servants (including 
police) of Chinese nationality and Portuguese and 
other foreign nationalities previously serving in 
Macao may .all remain in employment and continue 
their service with pay, allowances and benefits no 
less favourable than before. Those of the above-
mentioned public servants who have retired after 
the establishment of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region shall. in accordance with 
regulations currently in force. be entitled to 
pensions and allowances on terms no less 
favourable than before. and irrespective of their 
nationality or "place of residence. 
The Macao Special Administrative Region 
may appoint Portuguese and other foreign 
nationals previously serving in the public service in 
Macao or currently holding Permanent Identity 
Cards of the Macao Special Administrative Region 
to public posts (except certain principal official 
posts). The Macao Special Administrative Region 
may also invite Portuguese and other foreign 
nationals to serve as advisers or hold professional 
and technical posts. The Portuguese and other 
foreign nationals holding public posts in the Macao 
Special Administrative Region shall be employed 
only in their individual capacities and shall be 
rc,pon>~ble exclusively to the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. 
The appointment and promotion of public 
servants shall be on the basis of qualifications, 
experience and ability. Macao's previous system of 
employment. discipline. promotion and normal rise 
in rank for the public service shall remain basically 
unchanged. 
VII 
The Macao Special Administrative Region 
shall on its own decide policies in the fields of 
culture. education. science and technology. such as 
policies regarding the languages of instruction 
(including Portuguese) and the system of academic 
qualifications and the recognition of academic 
degrees. All educational institutions may remain in 
operation and retain their autonomy. They may 
continue to recruit teaching and administrative staff 
and use teachinll materials from outside Macao. 
Students shall "C,njoy freedom to pursue their 
education outside the Macao Special Administra-
tive Region. The Macao Special Administrative 
Region shall protect cultural relics in Macao 
according to law. 
VIII 
Subject to the principle that foreign affairs are 
the responsibility of the Central People's 
Government, the Macao Special Administrative 
Region may on its own, using the name "Macao, 
China", maintain and develop relations and 
conclude and implement agreements with states, 
regions and relevant international or regional 
organizations in the appropriate fields, such as the 
economy, trade, finance, shipping, communic-
ations, tourism, culture, science and technology and 
sports. Representatives of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region Government may partici-
pate, as members of the delegations of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China, in 
international organizations or conferences in 
appropriate fields limited to states and affecting the 
Macao Special Administrative Region, or may 
attend in such other capacity as may be permitted 
by the Central People's Government and the 
organization or conference concerned. and may 
express their views in the name of"Macao, China." 
The Macao Special Administrative Region may, 
using the name "Macao, China," participate in 
international organizations and conferences not 
limited to states. 
Representatives of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region Government may partici-
pate, as members of delegations of the Government 
of the People's Republic of China. in negotiations 
conducted by the Central People's Government at 
the diplomatic level directly affecting the Macao 
Special Administrative Region. 
The application to the Macao Special 
Administrative Region of international agreements 
to which the People's Republic of China is or 
becomes a party shall be decided by the Central 
People's Government, in accordance with the 
circumstances of each case and the needs of the 
Macao Special Administrative Region and after 
seeking the views of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region Government. International 
agreements to which the People's Republic of China 
is not a party but which are implemented in Macao 
may remain implemented in the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. The Central People's 
Government shall. according to the circumstances 
and the needs, authorize or assist the Macao Special 
Administrative Region Government to make 
appropriate arrangements for the application to the 
Macao Special Administrative Region of other 
relevant international agreements. 
The Central People's Government shall, in 
accordance with the circumstances of each case and 
the needs of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region, take steps to ensure that the Macao Special 
Administrative Region shall continue to retain its 
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status in an appropriate capacity in those 
international organizations of which the People's 
Republic of China is a member and in which Macao 
participates in one capacity or another. The Central 
People's Government shall, according to the 
.circumstances and the needs, facilitate the 
continued participation of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region in an appropriate capacity 
in those international organizations in which 
Macao is a participant in one capacity or another, 
but of which the People's Republic of China is not a 
member. 
Foreign consular and other official or semi-
official missions may be established in the Macao 
Special Administrative Region with the approval of 
the Central People's Government. Consular and 
other official missions established in Macao by 
states which have established formal diplomatic 
relations with the People's Republic of China may 
be maintained. According to the circumstances of 
each case. consular and other official missions in 
Macao o.f states having no formal diplomatic 
relations with the People's Republic of China may 
either be maintained or changed to semi-official 
missions. States not recognized by the People's 
Republic of China can only establish non-
governmental institutions. 
The Republic of Portugal may establish a 
Consulate-General in the Macao Special Admini-
strative Region. 
IX 
The following categories of persons shall have 
the right of abode in the Macao Special 
Administrative Region and be qualified to obtain 
Permanent Identity Cards of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region: 
-the Chinese nationals who were born or who 
have ordinarily resided in Macao before or after the 
establishment of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region for a continuous period of 7 years or more, 
and persons of Chinese nationality born outside 
Macao of such Chinese nationals; 
-the Portuguese who were born in Macao or 
who have ordinarily resided in Macao before or 
after the establishment of the Macao Special 
Administr.ttive Region for a continuous period of7 
years or more and who, in either case, have taken 
Macao as their place of permanent residence; and 
-the other persons who have ordinarily 
resided in Macao for a c.imtinuous period of7 years 
or more and have taken Macao as their place of 
permanent residence before or after the 
estahli~hment of the Macao Special Administrative 
R,·eio>n. and persons under I 8 years of age who were 
born of such persons in Macao before or after the 
establishment of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region. 
The Central People's Government shall 
authorize the Macao Special Administrative 
Region Government to issue. in accordance with 
the law. passports of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China to all Chinese nationals who hold Permanent 
Identity Cards of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region. and other travel documents of the Macao 
Special Administrative Region of the People's 
Republic of China to all other persons lawfully 
residing in th~ Macao Special Administrative 
Region .. 
The above passports and travel documents of 
the Macao Special Administrative Region shall be 
valid for all states and regions and shall record the 
holders· right to return to the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. 
For the purpose of travelling io and from the 
Macao Special Administrative Region. inhabitants 
of the Macao Special Administrative Region may 
use travel documents issued hy the Macao Special 
Administrative Region Government, or by other 
competent authorities of the People's Republic of 
China, or of other states. Holders of Permanent 
Identity Cards of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region may have this fact stated in their travel 
documents as evidence that the holders have the 
right of abode in the Macao Special Administrative 
Region. 
Entry into the Macao Special Administrative 
Region by inhabitants of other parts of China shall 
be regulated in an appropriate way. 
The Macao Special Administrative Region 
may apply immigration controls on entry into. stay 
in and departure from the Macao Special 
Administrative Region by persons from foreign 
states and regions. 
Unless restrained by law, holders of valid 
travel documents shall be free to leave the Macao 
Special Administrative Region without special 
authorization. 
The Central People's Government shall assist 
or authorize the Macao Special Administrative 
Region Government to negotiate and conclude visa 
abolition agreements with the states and regions 
concerned. 
X 
The Macao Special Administrative Region 
shall decide its economic and trade policies on its 
own. As a free port and a separate customs 
territory, it shall maintain and develop economic 
SETTLEMENT OF THE MACAO ISSUE 35 
and trade relations with all states and regions and 
continue to participate in relevant international 
organizations and international trade agreements. 
such as the General Aereement on Tariffs and 
Trade and agreements regarding international trade 
in textiles. Export quotas. tariff preferences and 
other simi far arrangements obtained by the Macao 
Special Administrative Region shall be enjoyed 
exclusively by the Macao Special Administrative 
Region. The Macao Special Administrative Region 
shall have authority to issue its own certificates of 
origin for products manufactured locally. in 
accordance with prevailing rules of origin. 
The Macao Special Administrative Region 
shall protect foreign investments in accordance with 
the law. 
The Macao Special Administrative Region 
may. as necessary. establish official and semi-
official economic and trade missions in foreign 
countries. reporting the establishment of such 
missions to the Central Peoples Government for 
the record. 
XI 
After the establishment of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. the monetary and financial 
systems previously practised in Macao shall remain 
basically unchanged. The Macao Special Admini-
strative Region shall decide its monetary and 
financial policies on its own. It shall safeguard the 
free operation of the financial institutions and the 
free flow of capital within. into and out of the 
Macao Special Administrative Region. No 
exchange control policy shall be applied in the 
Macao Special Administrative Region. 
The Macao pataca. as the legal tender of the 
Macao Special Administrative Region. shall 
continue to circulate and remain freely convertible. 
The authority to issue Macao currency shall be 
vested in the Macao Special Administrative Region 
Government. The Macao Special Administrative 
Region Government may authorize designated 
banks to perform or continue to perform the 
functions of its agents in the issuance of Macao 
currency. Macao currency bearing references 
inappropriate to the status of Macao as a special 
administrative region of the Peoples Republic of 
China shall be progressi' cl~ replaced and 
withdrawn I rum circulation. 
XII 
The Macao Special Administrative Region 
shall draw up on its own its budget and taxation 
policy. The Macao Special Administrative Region 
shall report its budgets and final accounts to the 
Central People's Government for the record. The 
Macao Special Administrative Region shall use its 
financial revenues exclusively for its own purposes 
and they shall not be handed over to the Central 
People's Government. The Central Peoples 
Government shall not levy taxes on the Macao 
Special Administrative Region. 
XIII 
The Central People's Government shall be 
responsible for the defence of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. 
The maintenance of public order in the Macao 
Special Administrative Region shall be the 
responsibility of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region Government. 
XIV 
Legal leases of land granted or decided upon 
before the establishment of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region and extending beyond 
December 19, 1999, and all rights in relation to such 
leases shall be recognized and protected according 
to law by the Macao Special Administrative 
Region. Land leases approved or renewed after the 
establishment of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region shall be dealt with in accordance with the 
relevant land laws and policies of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. 
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Annex II 
Arrangements for the Transitional Period 
In order to ensure the effective implementation of the Joint Declaration of the Government of the 
People's.Republic of China and the Governmem of 
the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macao 
and create appropriate conditions for the transfer of 
government of Macao. the Government of the 
People's Republic of China and the Government of 
the Republic of Portugal have agreed to continue 
their friendly co-operation during the transitional 
period between the date of the entry into force of the 
Joint Declaration and December 19. 1999. 
For this purpose. the Government of the 
People's Republic of China and the Government of 
the Republic of Portugal have agreed to set up a 
Sino-Portuguese Joint Liaison Group and a Sino-
Portuguese Land Group in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraphs 3. 4 and 5 of the Joint 
Declaration. 
I. Sino-Portuguese Joint Ualson Group 
I. The Joint Liaison Group shall be an organ 
for liaison. consultation and exchange of 
information between the two governments. It shall 
not interfere in the administration of Macao. nor 
shall it have any supervisory role over that 
administration. 
2. The functions of the Joint Liaison Group 
shall he: 
(a) to conduct consultations on the imple-
mentation of the Joint Declaration and its Annexes; 
(b) to exchange information and conduct 
consultations on matters relating to the transfer of 
government of Macao in I 999; 
- (c) to conduct consultations on actions to be 
taken by the two governments to enable the Macao 
Special Administrative Region to maintain and 
develop external economic. cultural and other 
relations; 
(d) to exchange information and conduct 
consultations on other subjects as may be agreed by 
the two sides. 
Matters on which there is disagreement in the 
Joint Liaison Group shall be referred to the two 
governments for solution through consultations. 
3. Each side shall designate a leader of 
ambassadorial rank and four other members of the 
group. Each side may also designate experts and 
supporting staff as required, whose number shall be 
determined throuuh consultations. 
· 4. The Joint Liaison Group shall be established 
on the entry into force of the Joint Declaration and 
shall start work within three months after its 
establishment. It shall meet in Beijing. Lisbon and 
Macao alternately in the first year of work. 
Thereafter, it shall have its principal base in Macao. 
The Joint Liaison Group shall continue its work 
until I January 2000. 
5. Members. experts and supporting staff of the 
Joint Liaison Group shall enjoy diplomatic 
privileges and immunities or such privileges and 
immunities as are compatible with their status. 
6. The working and organizational procedures 
oft!Je Joint Liaison Group shall be agreed between 
the two sides through consultations within the 
guidelines laid down in this Annex. The work of the 
Joint Liaison Group shall remain confidential 
unless otherwise agreed. 
II. Sino-Portuguese Land Group 
I. The two governments have agreed that. with 
effect from the entry into force of the Joint 
Declaration. land leases in Macao and related 
matters shall be dealt with in accordance with the 
following provisions: 
(a) Leases of land granted previously by the 
Portuguese Macao government that expire before 
December I 9, I 999, except temporary leases and 
leases for special purposes. may. in accordance with 
the relevant Jaws and regulations currently in force: 
be extended for a period expiring not later than 
December I 9. 2049, with a premium to be collected. 
(b) From the entry into force of the Joint 
Declaration until December 19. 1999 and in 
accordance with the relevant laws and regulations 
currently in force, new leases ofland may be granted 
by the Portuguese Macao government for terms 
expiring not later than December I 9. 2049. with a 
premium to be collected. 
(c) The total amount of new land. including 
fields reclaimed from the sea and undeveloped land. 
to be granted under Section II. paragraph l(b) of 
this Annex shall be limited to 20 hectares a year. The 
Land Group may. on t~ basis of the proposals of 
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the Portuguese Macao government, examine any 
change in the above-mentioned quota and make 
decisions accordingly. 
(d) From the entry into force of the Joint 
Declaration until December 19, 1999, all incomes 
obtained by the Portuguese Macao government 
from granting new leases and renewing leases shall. 
after deduction of the average cost of land 
production, be shared equally between the 
Portuguese Macao government and the future 
government of the Macao Special Administrative 
Region. All the income so obtained from land by the 
Portuguese Macao government, including the 
amount of the above-mentioned deduction, shall be 
used for financing land development and public 
works in Macao. The Macao Special Administra-
tive Region Government's share of land income 
shall serve as a reserve fund of the government of 
the Macao Special Administrative Region and shall 
be deposited in banks incorporated in Maca.a and. if 
necessary, may be used by the Portuguese Macao 
government for land development and public works 
in Macao during the transitional period with the 
endorsement of the Chinese side. 
2. The Sino-Portugu~se Land Group shall be 
an organ for handling land leases in Macao and 
related matters on behalf of the two governments. 
3. The functions of the Land Group shall be: 
(a) to conduct consultations on the 
implementation of Section II of this Annex; · 
(b) to monitor the amount and terms of land 
granted. and division and use of income from land 
granted in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 11, paragraph I of this Annex. 
(c) to examine proposals of the Portuguese 
Macao government for drawing on the Macao 
Special Administrative Region Government's share 
of income from land and to make recommendations 
to the Chinese siae for decision. Matters on which 
there is disagreement in the Land Group shall be 
referred to the two governments for solution 
through con.ultau""'· 
4. Each side shall designate three membe·rs of 
the Land Group. Each side may also designate 
experts and supporting staff as required. whose 
number shall be determined through consultations. 
5. Upon the entry into force of the Joint 
Declaration. the Land Group shall be established 
and shall have its principal base in Macao. The 
Land Group shall continue its work until December 
19. 1999. 
6. Members. experts and supporting staff of the 
Land Group shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and 
immunities or other privileges and immunities as 
are compatible with their status. 
7. The working and organizational procedures 
of the Land Group shall be agreed between the two 
sides through consultations within the guidelines 
laid down in this Annex. 
Memoranda 
(TO BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE TWO 
SIDES) 
Memorandum 
In connection with the Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China 
and the Government of the Republic of Portugal on 
the Question of Macao signed this day, the 
Government of the People's Republic of China 
declares: 
The inhabitants in Macao who come under the 
provisions of the Nationality Law of the People's 
Republic of China. whether they are holders of the 
Portuguese travel or identity documents or not. 
have Chinese citizenship. Taking account of the 
historical background of Macao and its realities. the 
competent authorities of the Government of the 
People's Republic of China will permit Chinese 
nationals in Macao previously holding Portuguese 
travel documents to continue to use these 
documents for travelling to other states and regions 
after the establishment of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region. The above-mentioned 
Chinese nationals wiil not be entitled to Portuguese 
consular protection in the Macao Special 
Administrative Region and other parts of the 
People's Republic of China. 
Memorandum 
In connection with the Joint Declaration of the Government of the Republic of Portugal and the 
Government of the People's Republic of China on 
the Question of Macao signed this day, the 
Government of the Republic of Portugal declares: 
In conformity with the Portuguese legislation. 
the inhabitants in Macao who. having Portuguese 
citizenship. are holders of a Portuguese passport on 
December 19. 1999 may continue to use it after this 
date. No person may acquire Portuguese citizenship 
as from December 20. 1999 by virtue of his or her 
connection with Macao. 
Note: Instruments of Ratification were exchanged on January 15, 1988. See Asian Bulletin. 
Vol. 13, No. 3 (March 1988}, pp. 33-34. 
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